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Labour Standards and Regulation in GVCs: The Case of the New Zealand 
Fishing Industry 
 
Abstract  
Building on the concept of polarity in global value chains (GVCs), we explore how the nature of the 
governance of a GVC can evolve and how contingencies can reshape governance arrangements. A 
case study of the New Zealand fishing industry highlights how parties inside and outside the GVC 
came to contest labour standards, laying the base for credible regulation. In 2011 through a series of 
convergent events, migrant crew on board South Korean fishing vessels, hitherto exploited, abused 
and isolated, emerged as a significant actor to bring about a clear transition in the governance of a 
multipolar GVC. In this paper we analyse the series of events which led to regulatory change and 
consider whether the dynamics from the case offer lessons for improving labour standards and 
regulation in GVCs more generally. 
 
 
Introduction  
The focus of this paper is a disturbing case-study of contemporary labour exploitation in a fisheries 
global value chain (GVC). For many years, migrant crew members of foreign charter fishing vessels 
(FCVs), and in particular on some South Korean vessels, operating in New Zealand waters endured 
outrageous conditions. Those conditions gave rise to campaigns, research and, eventually, legislation 
designed to bring to an end to such behaviours. The case-study also allows us to look at the 
pressures that gave rise to that legislation, and at the mechanisms available to States and other 
actors seeking to prevent labour abuse and establish effective labour standards in similar GVCs.  
The case exposes the contingencies that marked the campaign for improved protection. Particular 
configurations of actors and circumstances emerged in New Zealand (and beyond), driven by the 
egregious actions of the FCV owners, operators, and contractors. The case also offers some 
potentially generalizable insights. The GVC in question may be characterized as multipolar, in which 
the power to set standards was diffuse. Contests such as the one described may ironically offer an 
arena in which to define, implement and amend  labour regulation, thereby improving labour 
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standards. This dynamic is different from that in unipolar GVCs (RiIsgaard and Hammer, 2011). 
Hence the case illustrates the kinds of collective action that can make a difference in a situation of 
multipolarity. Specifically, we show below that whilst many drivers of good labour standards – the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political activism, 
for example – all played a part in achieving new legislated protections, more important was the 
particular way in which those drivers engaged with the GVC parties, New Zealand as a nation-state, 
and the nature of the activity in question – deep sea fishing.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We locate this paper in the GVC literature, looking at how labour 
may shape governance arrangements before discussing New Zealand’s industrial fisheries GVC. The 
following section discusses methods before laying out the details of the FCV case-study. We look 
briefly at the regulatory environment in New Zealand, and then in turn at key drivers - at company 
and national levels - that impacted on GVC governance. Finally, we offer some thoughts about the 
significance of the case for regulatory control over labour relations in GVCs. 
Global Value Chains 
GVCs link firms across geographical space, through a governance structure as well as the institutional 
context in which firms are embedded (Henderson et al., 2002). According to Gereffi et al. (2008: 6) 
“production activities previously carried out by vertically integrated firms are now sliced into pieces 
and dispersed into various locations”; these “scattered activities are subject to tight integration and 
coordination by transnational lead firms through global supply chains”. Lead firms strategically 
coordinate the value chain through the distribution of resources and profit. Key to coordination is 
the inter-firm exchange occurring at particular nodes along the chain (Gibbon et al., 2008). Lead 
firms drive the value chain “through specific mechanics that are related to the nature of entry 
barriers and core competencies” (Ponte, 2014: 359). In doing so they define chain membership, 
through both inclusion and exclusion mechanisms, in order to generate higher rents and allocate 
value added activities (Ponte, 2014).  
Much of the GVC research to-date has implicitly characterised governance as internal to the value 
chain and unipolar (that is, a lead firm plays the dominant governance role) in nature (Bair and 
Palpaceur, 2015). Other researchers have identified bipolar chains wherein two sets of actors drive 
the chain (Fold, 2002; Islam, 2009; Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011; Sturgeon, 2002). More recently, 
Ponte (2014; see also Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014) extended the concepts of unipolar and bipolar 
value chains to a continuum between unipolar and multipolar value chains. The latter differ from 
markets “because they are shaped by the explicit strategic actions of powerful actors (both inside 
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and outside the chain), even if they exhibit multiple foci of power and various kinds of linkages” 
(Ponte, 2014: 359). Non-firm actors outside the chain include non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), social movements and labour unions (Ponte, 2014).  
The institutional dimension sheds light on why economic agents are entrenched in a particular 
geography and the ways institutions impact on firm strategies (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009). For, as 
Sturgeon (2001: 11) stated, GVCs “do not exist in a vacuum but within a complex matrix of 
institutions and supporting industries”. By their extended geographical nature, GVCs often cross 
many national borders (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Bair, 2009). Inevitably, the question of 
jurisdiction arises, for it is unlikely that a nation state has comprehensive ‘reach’ across a GVC in 
terms of regulation (Coe, Dicken and Hess, 2008). While the governance of a GVC may rest primarily 
in the power of a single lead firm, that may not make controlling things much easier. The contractual 
arrangements within GVCs allow measures of control through sub-contracting agreements (Lakhani, 
Kuruvilla and Avgar, 2013) that are often not easily susceptible to intervention by national 
enforcement agencies. Moreover, such is the sophistication of some GVC governance arrangements, 
it may well be that national enforcement regimes are ill-conformed and equipped organisationally to 
address the challenges posed by the monitoring and enforcement of standards in GVCs. The 
configuration of a GVC may well be beyond the current legislative capacity of the individual nation-
state and even international regulatory measures.  
Ponte and Sturgeon (2014) highlight that most GVCs encompass a variety of linkage types. The 
character of these linkages “may have great influence on how a value chain in its entirety is 
governed” (p. 206). Further, the nature of the linkages can differ between nodes of the value chain.  
This is important in the context of our paper, which focuses on the governance of the upstream end 
of the fisheries value chain. We contend that the nature of the governance of a particular GVC, or 
segment of a value chain, can evolve and that contingencies may occur which reshape governance 
arrangements (Gereffi and Lee, 2015). While multipolar chains can be actively governed by the 
‘explicit strategic actions’ of actors inside and outside of the chain, they can also be characterised by 
lower levels of ‘drivenness’ as “power is more dispersed” (Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014: 215).  
Further, GVCs are social as well as economic institutions, influencing and governing the actions of 
those engaged in its activities (Gereffi and Mayer, 2004; Gereffi and Lee, 2015). Thus, GVCs are 
patterns of behaviour and practice around which expectations converge. Social expectations are 
governed by agreed norms among those engaged in the economic functioning of the GVC. Lead firms 
can set such norms either as an extension of their own governance structures or as an outcome of 
broader regulatory requirements. Such an institutional framework acts as a compliance pull within 
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and among the different economic units of the GVC. Central to our understanding of the functioning 
of the institutional framework is the power and role of the lead firm. However, in the absence of a 
strong lead firm, social norms within GVCs are largely contingent on the activities of the individual 
economic units. In this regard, a GVC may be founded on an agreement – perhaps implicit and 
unwritten - that seeks to organise a diverse and often complex set of economic and social 
relationships in integrated and mutually beneficial ways. What such arrangements establish are 
mutual expectations about modes of behaviour and the practices that support them. In seeking to 
establish a stable system of relations, the transparency of actor behaviour and the enforcement of 
internationally agreed norms become important in our understanding of non-lead firm GVCs. To this 
end, labour agency protests (Herod, 1997) and popular campaigns against management behaviour 
within a GVC can be particularly effective instruments in creating this transparency (Authors, 2014). 
However, the mechanisms which social and political actors employ to do this remain an important 
but under-researched consideration in GVC analysis (Bair and Palpacuer, 2015). 
Governance and labour standards 
Governance engagement with  labour standards within GVCs has received increased attention in 
recent years (cf. Authors, 2014; Barrientos, 2013; Barrientos et al., 2013; Bastia and McGrath 2011; 
Phillips and Mieres, 2015; Phillips and Sakamoto, 2012; Strauss, 2012; 2013). Offshoring of 
production has led to increasing complexities in labour contract arrangements (Barrientos, 2013; 
Barrientos et al., 2013) which in turn have exacerbated monitoring and enforcement (Authors, 
2014). Barrientos (2011: 4) argues that “labour contracting is a logical extension of global 
outsourcing of production, where risk and cost are offset down value chains”.  Suppliers and 
producers seek to manage pressures in GVCs through labour chains, and in particular through cost-
cutting pressures. Phillips and Mieres (2015) hold that while examples of abusive treatment of 
labour are often deliberately treated as rogue and aberrant, they follow the logic of such pressures. 
Citing Harrod (1987), they posit: “It is important to emphasize that in these conditions a reduction in 
labour costs does not come about through higher productivity…; rather, it is achieved through the 
ruthless pursuit of flexibility, relentless downward pressure on wages and conditions, and active 
construction of a disarticulated and highly vulnerable workforce” (Phillips and Mieres, 2015: 251-
252).  
Participation in a GVC can change the composition of a labour force through downward pressures on 
conditions.  Subsequent interventions such as economic and social upgrading are contingent on the 
quality of governance frameworks in which international labour standards are observed (ILO, 2013; 
Knorringa and Pegler, 2006; OECD, 2013; Shingal, 2015). Previous research has highlighted how 
 5 
 
unipolar governance modes can facilitate the implementation of labour standards along the value 
chain. Adopting the notion of ‘governance as drivenness’ (rather than ‘governance as coordination’), 
for instance, Riisgaard and Hammer (2011: 174-175) argue that GVCs with hands-on lead firms 
“open the strategic option of targeting the powerful actor(s) in the chain, the driver(s), whereas 
labour will find it much more difficult to systematically tackle less driven chains, particularly when 
they are characterized by market-based relationships.” On the other hand, counter-examples may 
be offered, in which lead firms are so powerful that they can diminish labour standards through 
political leverage. In the case of the New Zealand film industry, for example, the presence of such 
players in Hollywood, working with representatives of the domestic industry, were able in 2011 to 
demand a marked reduction in labour protection for film crews (Haworth, 2011). 
In terms of multipolar governance, public and social actors provide possibilities for labour to shape 
governance arrangements. At the public level, international framework agreements and private 
social standards are “avenues for labour to shape the governance of value chains, by using the 
power of lead firms for enforcement and transforming aspects of the employment relationship into 
entry barriers for participation in the chain” (Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011: 175). In turn, social 
actors can be effective in regulating working conditions (Gereffi and Lee, 2015). Gereffi and Lee 
(2015) note that a multi-stakeholder approach is often more effective in bringing about change than 
a single actor approach. Importantly workers themselves can be “active change agents in improving 
their own social conditions” (p.9). 
Shepherd (2013) suggests that labour outcomes are influenced by the type of activities undertaken 
by GVC participants and would be ‘highly case specific’ (p.11). Similarly, in their analysis of labour 
standards and GVCs in the international sports goods industry, Nadvi et al. (2011) concluded that the 
impact of labour standards on global production arrangements will “play out in different ways in 
different locations” influenced by sourcing histories, GVC configuration and local institutional 
arrangements (2011: 351). For Posthuma and Nathan (2010), to understand multi-polar governance, 
geography matters. 
Finally, GVCs change in response to their own internal dynamics as well as their political, economic 
and social environments. Power configurations are complex, involving contingent governance 
structures and the embeddedness of practices through which power is exerted (Coe and Hess, 2013: 
5). These dynamics are not mutually exclusive, and indeed may reinforce each other during periods 
of critical change and uncertainty. The configuration of the chain may matter a great deal for those 
who work in them. Some GVCs are characterised by a low level of ‘drivenness’, and if triggered by 
contingencies, can be reshaped according to the nature of the contingency. In some situations 
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chronic labour abuses may persist for many years in the absence of obvious levers for change. Such 
was the situation in the New Zealand fishing industry.  
The New Zealand Fisheries GVC 
New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) established in 1977, is the sixth largest in the world;   
FCVs began fishing in the EEZ in the late 1970s in partnership with New Zealand fishing enterprises. 
Under the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal nations have priority access to fish 
resources within its 200 mile jurisdiction. As many New Zealand fishing enterprises did not have the 
vessel capacity to catch their deep water catch allocation, the New Zealand government encouraged 
the formation of joint ventures (JVs) with foreign fishing companies. The JVs were intended to be an 
interim measure until New Zealand companies built up their capacity and expertise.  South Korean 
fishing companies were amongst the first to operate under this arrangement.  The New Zealand 
model was in sharp contrast to other developed countries wherein domestically flagged vessels 
operated almost exclusively in their EEZ.   
In the 2010/2011 fishing year, there were 56 vessels operating in New Zealand’s EEZ, of which 27 
were foreign flagged vessels under charter to New Zealand fishing companies. The remaining New 
Zealand flagged vessels were operated by 17 New Zealand companies dominated by the three 
largest fishing companies: Sanford, Sealord and Talley’s (Ministerial Inquiry into Foreign Charter 
Vessels, 2012). In this same fishing year, FCVs caught 51% of major fish species. Almost all of the fish 
caught in New Zealand’s EEZ is exported (Ministerial Inquiry into Foreign Charter Vessels, 2012). Half 
of the FCVs vessels – 13 – were flagged to South Korea (Dawson, 2012).  
New Zealand’s industrial fisheries value chain can be mapped out as follows, using the example of 
South Korean vessels.  At the upstream end,  New Zealand quota owners (those who hold rights to 
harvest fish stocks) or charter parties contracted out fishing to South Korean operators. The vessels 
operated on a time charter arrangement whereby the vessel was chartered fully crewed by the New 
Zealand charterer party but operated by South Korean fishing companies within the New Zealand 
institutional framework (Authors, 2014). Vessels were crewed by South Korean officers, but lower 
rank crew members were recruited through recruitment agents from elsewhere in Asia, 
predominately Indonesia, often under deceptive and exploitative recruitment conditions (Authors, 
2016).   
The New Zealand charterer directed the vessel as to the location, type and quantity of the catch, 
while the South Korean operators controlled the key nodes of harvesting and production. Basic 
production occurred at sea – for example heading and gutting of fish – with much of the catch 
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exported to China for post-harvest processing, and subsequently re-exported to key markets in the 
US and Europe as a ‘Product of New Zealand’ (Authors, 2011b). A variety of wholesalers and retailers 
purchased the fish. One South Korean company fishing in New Zealand’s EEZ – Dong Wong Fisheries 
Co. Ltd - operates a value-added processing plant in China; this plant is a joint venture operation 
with Sanford (Author, 2010; Dong Wong, 2015). Catch from the South Korean FCVs was also 
exported to South Korea under tariff-free entry.  This catch is processed and sold within Korea as 
well as to international markets. 
Migrant fishers employed by foreign fishing operators were required to hold temporary New 
Zealand work visas. It was the responsibility of the New Zealand charterer to apply to Immigration 
New Zealand for an Approval in Principle (AIP) to recruit crew and subsequently apply for work visas. 
Crew were to be employed under a New Zealand contract that incorporated minimum terms and 
conditions provided by law. In practice, the crew were employed under three different contracts 
(Indonesian, New Zealand and South Korean), each designed to meet the regulatory requirements of 
the respective countries (Authors, 2016).  
The FCV fisheries value chain is a commodity, high-volume chain predicated on maximizing catches 
and minimising costs. South Korean operators sought to minimise costs through their control of 
labour and labour chains. The multipolar cost driven chain extended across firm boundaries and 
national frontiers, operating under unclear institutional frameworks.  While the vessels were fishing 
on behalf of New Zealand charterers, the value chain was controlled by South Korean fishing 
companies. There was little opportunity for the New Zealand chartering party to capture, or add 
economic value (Authors, 2011a; Talley’s Group, 2011). Moreover, the New Zealand institutional 
context was such that FCVs acted “largely in a regulatory and compliance ‘vacuum’ … [leading] to 
undesirable exploitative practices” (Talley’s Group, 2011: 4). At the downstream end of the chain, 
buying firms, such as large-scale wholesalers (like Mazzetta in the US) and retailers exercise power 
over secondary processors by pressuring them to meet specifications and cost. This in turn impacts 
on fishing and production practices, placing increased pressure on margins (Authors, 2011b).  
Methods 
Between 2011 and 2014 we undertook 293 semi-structured interviews with migrant crew members 
from Indonesia, Burma, China and the Philippines who had worked on board South Korean FCVs, as 
well as with industry personnel in Indonesia and New Zealand, government and NGO 
representatives. Access to the Indonesian crew was initially obtained through the Indonesian Society 
in New Zealand before employing a snowballing strategy. Interviews with crew were conducted 
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using translators and lasted between one and four hours with follow-up interviews undertaken with 
a number of crew members. On occasion dual translators were used for rigour.  
We obtained official documents pursuant to the New Zealand Official Information Act 1982. The 
documents included: observers’ handwritten diaries, Ministry of Fisheries and Department of Labour 
reports, Immigration New Zealand AIP documents and Ministerial communications. We also 
obtained employment contracts (Indonesian, New Zealand and South Korean), evidence of 
recruitment fees paid to manning agents along with receipts for security and deeds of security, wage 
calculation sheets, pay slips, crew bank statements, and forged electronic funds transfer receipts 
used by employers to demonstrate that crew members had received their legal wage entitlements. 
The documents verified interview data.  
Labour Conditions and the New Zealand Regulatory Environment 
The case which follows highlights how change did come about, through a series of convergent 
contingencies. After describing these, we analyze whether there are lessons which can be drawn, 
despite the contingencies, which may be more broadly applicable. 
Recruitment practices 
The Indonesian crew were sourced through crewing agents. In order to secure employment, 
crew were required to pay the agents a fee as well as sign-over collateral, for example land 
deeds, house titles, and other assets as a necessary condition. Some borrowed money from 
the agent in order to pay the recruitment fee, thus entering into debt bondage. Further, many 
were subjected to deceptive and coercive recruitment practices (Authors, 2016).  The agents 
played a key role in controlling the labour chain. Wages were paid directly to the agent, who 
would transfer a percentage of the money to the crew member’s family. The remainder was 
held by the agent until the crew member had completed their contract. If they failed to 
complete their contract, crew forfeited their collateral as well as the wages held by the agents 
(Authors, 2014). This system exerted a powerful control function over workers.   
Employment conditions 
In 2011, Indonesian crew members from a number of South Korean FCVs walked off their 
vessels while berthed in New Zealand ports, citing non-payment of wages. Many also reported 
verbal, physical and sexual abuse (Authors, 2014). Conditions aboard vessels were harsh, with 
crew members working in unsafe and unsanitary conditions. Living quarters were cramped, 
damp and filthy, Bed bugs were common (Interviewees 1 and 6). Often mattresses were 
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decrepit or crew members were required to use old dirty blankets for a mattress (Interviewees 
6 and 20). Basic necessities such as food and water were insufficient and of poor quality. On 
board many vessels, food supplies were rationed and locked up and if the crew members 
asked for more food, they were verbally abused by the Korean officers (Interviewees 40, 43, 
53, 62, 198). On one vessel, crew members were mostly only permitted small quantities of 
meat or fish, with little or no fresh produce. One interviewee recalled only being allowed one 
piece of fruit – an apple – a month.  
Many were forced to work excessively long shifts with insufficient rest periods. On average, they 
worked between 16 and 18 hours a day, 7 days a week, for a 2 year period. During heavy fishing 
periods, shifts could be more than 30 hours, with breaks curtailed or not permitted. Falling asleep 
while working resulted in brutal punishment. A large number of interviewees reported that they had 
been required to sign blank timesheets or timesheets reflecting incorrect hours. They were abused if 
they queried the hours on the timesheet that they were required to sign. One was required by the 
captain to forge signatures on other crew member’s timesheets (Interviewee 203). Many crew did 
not receive the full amount of wages owed them under their Indonesian contract and money was 
deducted without explanation.  
A culture of degrading verbal abuse, intimidation, frequent assault and battery of the crew by 
officers permeated many FCVs. One crew member became visibly upset as he recounted how, while 
eating lunch one day, the Bosun placed a sack over his head, and proceeded to punch his head until 
he had trouble breathing (Interviewee 71). On another vessel, a newly arrived crew member was 
ordered after his shift had finished on deck to help size fish in the processing factory. Not knowing 
how to undertake the task, he asked another crew member for guidance. For talking, his mouth was 
taped shut with packing tape by the factory manager (Interviewee 170).  
A number of crew members recounted distressing experiences of sexual harassment and rape. One 
interviewee described how his cabin mate was repeatedly raped by an officer. He frequently saw 
bite marks on his chest, and when asked why his cabin mate never complained, replied “no one 
would listen” (Interview 180). On board another vessel, another recalled that his “crew mate [was] 
raped in my cabin, beneath my bunk, many times … To make us shut our mouth the Second Officer 
paid money” (Interviewee 61). In recounting the sexual abuse, one interviewee stated: “I am 
embarrassed but he is the Master of the boat and I am powerless” (Interviewee 166). This lack of 
power was highlighted in many employment agreements; for example, “Crew shall bear round trip 
expenses for the crew who leaves the vessel by reason of discipline as long as the crew was not 
beating/torturing [sic] by the Korean crewmembers.” 
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Regulatory environment 
Exploitative working conditions aboard FCVs were addressed in the New Zealand Parliament in the 
early 1990s (Kelly, 1996). In response, the New Zealand government amended the Fisheries Act 
(1986) to ensure that the Minimum Wage Act 1983 and the Wages Protection Act 1983 applied to 
foreign crew on FCVs. In the Fisheries Act (1996), the Employment Relations Authority (ERA) and 
Employment Court had jurisdiction over employment disputes. The Act contained the provision for 
Department of Labour inspectors to monitor conditions aboard FCVs. However, this could only occur 
if a written complaint was received, in English, an unlikely event given that migrant crew could 
neither speak or write English. Despite the Act requiring that foreign crew be paid the New Zealand 
minimum wage, this provision was not effectively enforced.  
Claims of exploitation aboard FCVs continued to surface over the next two decades, highlighting the 
inadequacy of the Fisheries Act (1996) in protecting migrant crew (Kelly, 2005; Fenton, 2012). 
Between 2003 and 2005 there was a marked increase in the number of crew deserting vessels in 
New Zealand ports, which Immigration New Zealand attributed, in part, to conditions aboard the 
vessels (Authors, 2014). Despite these occurrences, between 1999 and 2004, labour inspectors 
conducted only two investigations to ensure crew aboard FCVs were paid according to the Minimum 
Wage Act 1983 (Swain, 2004).  
In 2004 the Department of Labour undertook a comprehensive investigation into two New Zealand 
companies with AIPs to recruit foreign crew to ensure compliance with New Zealand employment 
and immigration standards (Department of Labour, 2004). The investigation led to the introduction 
of a voluntary Code of Practice in 2006 along with a new immigration policy for crew visas. Authored 
by the Department of Labour, the Seafood Industry Council and the New Zealand Fishing Industry 
Guild, the Code of Practice (hereafter the Code) sought to deliver the “highest level of compliance in 
relation to both immigration requirements and applicable laws of New Zealand…Being a signatory 
and adhering to the Code became a mandatory part of requirements set by Government for the 
issue of immigration visas and permits to foreign fishing crew” (Department of Labour et al., 2006: 
4). The Code provided clear guidelines for companies engaging FCVs, for example minimum 
expectations pertaining to employment agreements, living and working conditions, as well as an 
audit process. A requirement for the AIPs was that the company must be a signatory to, and comply 
with, the Code, and it was intended that immigration policy would ensure compliance with the Code. 
The Code was widely debated within the industry. The inclusion of the Minimum Wage Act was seen 
as unwarranted Government interference, insofar as crew already “work for six months of the year 
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for a wage which is two to three times higher than the average wage in their home country, they are 
well treated…” (Batley quoted in ‘Proposed Government Changes will Put Iwi Fishing Companies in 
Jeopardy’, 2006). The preamble to the Code clearly stated that some within the fishing industry did 
not agree to the minimum wage requirements. The Code sought to apply domestic regulation to 
foreign vessels operating within New Zealand’s EEZ, but outside of its territoriality in respect to the 
12 nautical mile limit. In doing so, however, the Code violated international law (Devlin, 2009; 
Dawson and Hunt, 2011). Furthermore, the Code directed that employment matters must be dealt 
with by the ERA but the ERA had no jurisdiction over foreign owners. Moreover, as FCVs operated 
outside the 12 mile limit the Minimum Wage Act did not apply, thereby creating yet another 
jurisdictional issue.  
The Code included the provision for audits to be undertaken by Immigration New Zealand to ensure 
compliance with the AIPs. Thirty percent of all AIPs were scheduled to be audited each financial year. 
In practice the audits were largely desk-based and ineffective, with often questionable documents 
provided by the vessel operators, and taken at face value by the auditors (Dawson and Hunt, 2011). 
The staff undertaking audits lacked knowledge of industry practices and were not equipped to deal 
with the level of sophistication employed by some operators to disguise the real nature of their 
activities.  
Seeds of change 
In July 2011, following a public outcry about conditions in the FCV sector, the New Zealand 
government announced a Ministerial Inquiry. The Inquiry investigated whether foreign owned and 
flagged vessels fishing in New Zealand’s waters supported government objectives, particularly in 
regards to equitable labour standards. The findings were released in February 2012 and in May the 
same year the government announced that all foreign vessels fishing in New Zealand waters must be 
reflagged as New Zealand vessels by 1 May 2016, in order, first, to bring them fully under New 
Zealand labour, health and safety laws and, second, to place accountability directly with the New 
Zealand based charterer. In order for reflagging to become law, the Fisheries (Foreign Charter 
Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill was enacted in August 2014.  
Forces and Drivers of Change 
The 2014 enactment of protective legislation to eliminate abuses from FCVs is a successful, if 
modest, attempt to govern the labour standards within New Zealand’s fisheries GVC. We turn to an 
analysis of the main drivers of this success, assessing their relative weight and impact, and how they 
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combined to achieve this outcome. We have structured this discussion at company and national 
levels to illustrate the multipolar forces that transformed the governance mode. 
The company level 
The New Zealand context offers a striking, if complex, case-study of a clash of company perspectives 
on labour standards, a clash not without its ironies. Major players in the sector took quite different 
positions on work conditions on charter vessels. A number of major company players, including 
those owned by indigenous Māori, were firmly in favour of the existing arrangements, arguing that 
profitability was based on such arrangements. Such views reflected an acceptance of low-cost global 
production arrangements and the role of New Zealand companies therein. This position reflected a 
conscious, proactive engagement in those arrangements, reflecting in turn a common view in New 
Zealand companies that they were small ‘price takers’ in subordinate roles in a global order (Report 
of the Ministerial Inquiry into Foreign Charter Vessels, 2012: 36). 
One large player took a very different position. Talley’s supported improvements in labour 
conditions in the charter vessel sector, including the extension of New Zealand labour protections by 
legislative measures (Talley’s Group Ltd, 2011). This position was driven by a broader strategic 
interest in improved fishing and processing techniques, contributing to a higher value product and 
improved international market performance. Talley’s operates a fishing fleet in which pay and 
conditions are significantly better than those found in charter vessels, and are consistent with New 
Zealand’s national labour standards.  
The company-level clash of views can be understood at a number of levels. In a small country, it has 
important inter-personal dimensions. It also involves established political networks (including 
involvement of the ruling political party’s national president as a significant shareholder in one of 
the largest companies). At the industry level, it reflects two competing strategies for the fishing 
sector – one modelling a ‘low road’ exploitation of fish stocks, primarily emphasising external 
drivers, the other promoting a ‘high road, high value-add-and-capture’ model. At this level, the 
sector is debating forcefully the model for New Zealand and company integration in global 
production and distribution networks. The former model highlights subordination to external 
demand, the latter an opportunity for a degree of autonomy, if not authority, in the networks as an 
effect of control of scarce, high quality natural resources. The former is at best agnostic on labour 
standards, and at worst, actively promotes ‘low road’ standards. The latter perceives labour 
standards in two ways – as an essential dimension of a ‘high road’ model, and as a political weapon 
against ‘low road’ opponents.  
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As for the position of the Korean companies engaged in the chartering of their fishing vessels and 
the recruitment of crews, their long-established business model is predicated on a low-cost bulk-
harvesting charter system. The move to impose national labour regulation on their vessels 
fundamentally undermines that model. Our research found no evidence of awareness of, or 
adaptation to, corporate social responsibility models in the Korean charter vessel sector, arguably 
because they are at odds with the current dominant business model. Moreover, at least one South 
Korean company actively sought to circumvent their responsibility to pay back wages. Agents from 
the Sajo Oyang Corporation travelled to Indonesia offering a financial settlement in return for the 
crew withdrawing all claims both civil and criminal and foregoing legal representation. Those 
accepting the offer were required to sign ‘Peace Agreements’. Over time, the financial offers were 
increased and crew members reported being intimidated into accepting the agreement (Authors, 
2016). 
In contrast, a striking example of active governance involvement in labour issues emerged from US 
companies. Investigative journalist Benjamin Skinner (2012) identified US companies purchasing 
seafood from New Zealand companies linked to exploitative labour practices. The response by US 
companies was swift. Chicago-based Mazzetta publicly released two letters – the first to their 
customers and the second to Sanford. Mazzetta stated that they were “calling for immediate 
revision of Sanford’s oversight in this area… changes must be made for Mazzetta Company to 
continue its relationship with Sanford”1. Informing Sanford that “allegations of this nature are simply 
unacceptable”, Mazzetta requested Sanford to address immediately the issue. Other prominent US 
companies, Safeway and Costco, announced they would immediately undertake supply chain audits. 
The pressure point for US retailers was not just the negative business press coverage but also the 
California Transparency in Supply Chain Act (2010), which requires companies with over $US100 
million in sales and doing business in California to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery and 
human trafficking from their global supply chains.  
Formal institutions 
Contemporary New Zealand might not be considered a likely candidate to take strong regulatory 
action in support of migrant crews. Since 2008, its government has been conservative, supporting 
labour market deregulation. Labour protections have been eroded in numerous areas, in the name 
of a ‘rebalancing’ of power towards employers. This is in a broad context created by deregulatory 
legislation in 1990, which halved trade union membership and established a markedly pro-employer 
labour relations regime. Labour-led governments between 1999 and 2008 halted the deregulatory 
                                                          
1 Copies of letters available from the lead author. 
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process, but it gained ground once more after 2008 with the election of a National government. The 
current government’s stance might be described as strongly pro-business, pro-trade and pro-
exploitation of New Zealand’s natural resources. Equally, it might reasonably be described as anti-
trade union. New Zealand remains an active member of the ILO, but, the government is 
unsympathetic to the ILO’s message of social dialogue. On the face of things, there were no major 
internal or business drivers for regulatory intervention by the New Zealand government into labour 
standards in the charter vessel sector. 
However, the government was unable to ignore labour practices in that sector, for a number of 
reasons. First, the conditions aboard FCVs had been the source of public commentary for a number 
of years. This commentary was escalating. Second, research by academics interested in labour 
conditions on vessels was published and subsequently reported to parliament (Authors, 2011a). 
Third, there were some well-publicised examples of egregious behaviour by charter vessel 
companies, which were given wide public coverage (Devlin, 2009; Field, 2011a; 2011b). Fourth, trade 
unions and NGOs took action to publicise working conditions on the vessels and pressure 
government for change (MUNZ, 2011). Fifth, politicians took up the issue in the ministerial inquiry. 
Finally, the government itself came under international scrutiny, particularly from the US 
Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. In short, a confluence of 
factors emerged, which shone a harsh, unwavering and very public light on abuse and exploitation.  
One other factor must be considered in relation to national actions around labour standards in this 
sector. The resource in question – New Zealand’s fish stocks – are a locationally-specific resource. 
They cannot be moved as an effect of strategic decisions within a GVC. They are large, 
internationally important, and, in a world consuming ever-greater amounts of fish products, highly 
prized. Equally, they are subject to national policies seeking to maintain sustainable stock levels. This 
combination of factors means, on the one hand, a national regulatory regime can be extended 
across the sector with some confidence that, if it is monitored effectively, it will be successful; on the 
other hand, the desirability of access to these stocks of fish will mean that any added costs caused 
by the regulation will be borne, in the end, by the international consumer. It is, thus, easier to 
extend regulation in this case than, for example, over more mobile manufacturing capital. 
We now turn to South Korea to look at institutional developments there. Prior to the widespread 
allegations of abuse in New Zealand in 2011, complaints had been lodged with the South Korean 
government about abusive practices. In 2004 crew (both foreign and national) complained to the 
Ministry of Employment and Labour about working conditions on a Juham Industries vessel fishing in 
New Zealand’s EEZ. The crew also sought to lodge a verbal complaint to the Executive Office of the 
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President, but their complaint went unanswered (Kim, 2004). In 2011, following the claims of human 
rights abuses aboard a Sajo Oyang vessel, three South Korean NGOs - Advocates for Public Interest 
Law (APIL), Korean House for International Solidarity (KHIS), and the Centre for Good Corporations - 
submitted a complaint to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK), an independent 
government body. While the NHRCK is tasked with raising awareness of human rights violations 
(2005 NHRC Act, Article 19 and 26), its mandate is limited to human rights issues within South 
Korean sovereign territory (Article 4). This complaint was dismissed because the violation of human 
rights was between private individuals and hence was outside the scope of their jurisdiction. In 
addition, there was insufficient evidence of sexual harassment (NHRCK, 2012). The NHRCK did, 
however, encourage the Government to undertake an investigation and to enact measures to 
prevent human rights abuses against foreign crew members. NHRCK also called upon the 
Chairperson of the Korea Overseas Fisheries Association to include “employee-friendly clauses” in 
the Foreign Sailor’s Collective Agreement, and for Sajo Oyang Corporation to address working 
conditions aboard their vessels (NHRCK, 2012).  
In 2012, the South Korean government set up an inquiry team comprising six government ministries 
to investigate allegations of abuse. The inquiry team investigated Sajo Oyang, Dongwon, Dongnam, 
Taejin, Juham and GOM in relation to delays in payment of wages; non-compliance of employment 
contracts; forgery; and labour and human rights abuses (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport, 2012). The investigators found evidence of assault and forged employment 
documentation. They confirmed that crew members were denied their rights under the Korean 
Seamen’s Act. The Coast Guard launched a prosecution against Sajo Oyang for forgery, assault and 
sexual violations. The charges for assault and sexual violation were subsequently dropped and the 
accused found guilty of document forgery. The penalty was a four month suspended sentence. The 
South Korean government subsequently announced amendments to the Seamen Law and Ocean 
Industry Development Act as well as an increase in the minimum wage paid to foreign fishing crew.  
In contrast, in Indonesia - a key source country for migrant workers - little effort had been 
undertaken to afford protection to migrant workers in the fishing industry. While the Indonesian 
government has sought to strengthen protection frameworks for migrant workers, they have largely 
focused on migrant workers in the domestic sector. Indeed, the seafarers industry is not specifically 
covered by government policy. Furthermore, there was a lack of enforcement because of the 
magnitude of the problem and because of the difficulty in holding recruitment agencies accountable 
(Interviewee 203). However, more recently in 2015, the Indonesian Minister for Maritime Affairs and 
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Fisheries asked the New Zealand government to do more to protect Indonesian migrant fishers 
(Jakarta Post, 30 Nov 2015).   
Discussion  
The lessons of the FCV case-study inform our understanding of how different actors in a multipolar 
chain can bring about change. The first lesson relates to the sector and the resource in question. The 
location-specific resource, over which sovereign rights exist, provides a platform for regulatory 
interventions not open in other contexts in international production. Clearly, where such behaviours 
might have been found in, say, manufacturing capital, similar regulatory outcomes may have 
followed but with subsequent consequences for the long-term location of that capital. Equally, the 
potential to lose such investment might have had a limiting effect upon the regulatory intervention. 
Second, the abuses in the FCV sector were such that they could no longer be ignored. Despite the 
popularity of voluntary initiatives such as labour codes, evidence of their effectiveness in protecting 
and upgrading labour conditions is subject to “widespread failure … to effectively improve labour 
conditions in GVCs” (Siegmann et al., 2014: 6). The attempt by the New Zealand government to 
regulate labour conditions on FCVs initially failed through its reliance on a voluntary Code,  passive 
desk-based auditing of labour conditions and a dominant GVC model of cost minimisation facilitated 
through a spatially fragmented and exploited migrant labour force. In 2011, the spotlight shone on 
the excesses – by migrant workers, by media, by academic research, by trade unions and activists 
and indeed by the US government and retailers – required the New Zealand government to respond, 
despite lobbying and pressure by certain fractions of the industry, to the contrary.  
Third, the role of one major fishing company in New Zealand, publicly confronting the FCV model 
with an alternative approach based on high-road model of production, provided a breach in the 
governance of the GVC into which government could step in with regulation. Indeed, according to 
the findings of the Ministerial Inquiry, “It is apparent that differing views on the use of FCVs in New 
Zealand’s EEZ have caused a rift in the fishing industry” (Ministerial Inquiry into Foreign Charter 
Vessels, 2012: 34).  From this we conclude that some GVCs may develop internal contradictions 
which open up the potential for regulatory intervention and control by nation-states, operating 
alone or in consort. Those contradictions can take the form of irreconcilable conflict between key 
actors in the GVC that may lead to an emerging opportunity. This process directs our attention to 
the role of external pressure and how the institutional relationships within a GVC can respond, 
prompting us to identify not just the nature of these pressures but also their significance for GVC 
transformation. 
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The nature of institutional relationships is also central to the fourth lesson.  Foreign states, such as 
the US, were closely observing the New Zealand government’s response to international exposure of 
human rights abuses. Future entry into the EU market – a high value market for the industry - could 
prove problematic, due to the requirement by the EU for flag State catch certification and the 
reliance of the New Zealand industry on FCVs (Ministerial Inquiry into Foreign Charter Vessels, 2012). 
Importantly, the South Korean government was investigating ways to address labour abuses on 
board South Korean flagged vessels.  
Taking a broad view of what happened in relation to the FCV issue, it is clear that the success in 
winning improved protections for FCV crews in New Zealand waters was contingent primarily on that 
combination of a locationally-specific resource, the egregious nature of the abuse, the quality of the 
primarily-domestic campaign for improved protection, and the differences in perspective in the 
domestic industry as well as pressure from external institutions.  Amongst these, the unavoidable 
nature of the allegations of abuse, and the ability to act within a sovereign nation stand out as the 
determining features of the FCV case. 
The New Zealand fishing case points to a need to understand better the role of territory and space in 
GVC analysis, not least in understanding the condition and agency of labour and the efficacy of 
governance frameworks for labour protection anchored on internationally agreed norms. In doing 
so, we can move forward in addressing some of the key criticisms of the GVC literature which has 
tended to turn a ‘blind eye’ to factors that determine outcomes within the firm such as labour 
conditions (Siegmann et al., 2014: 5; Lakhani et al., 2013: 446; Knorringa and Pegler, 2006: 476) and 
in which the ability of workers to shape their workplace environment is rarely acknowledged or 
seriously considered (Azmeh, 2014; Rainnie et al., 2011). Instead, we must recognise ways in which 
production and labour control regimes vary and how the geography of the resource being extracted 
can shape the nature of workplace relations. In extension, by affording a greater role in GVC analysis 
of the State as an actor in its own right, perhaps contingent on domestic pressures for legislative 
change, we incorporate important links to the workplacein order to understand better how workers 
can bring about change in pursuit for social justice. 
Transformation of the exercise of power can arise from challenges to its underlying structure, both 
within the GVC and through external responses to the exploitative nature of this power. As our case 
demonstrates, a transformational process can emerge when forces that represent social and political 
interests intersect to initiate change in GVC behaviour through a combination of popular and 
legislative action. The focus is to change the essential practices of a GVC that emphasise a low-end, 
cost-minimization model in which labour exploitation is rife. This recognition reminds us of the 
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dangers of thinking about a GVCs in isolation from the broader territorial and social setting in which 
it operates. 
This also forces us to recognise not only that actor interests may change in response to new 
knowledge, as was the case with the New Zealand government, but also that broader coalitions may 
feed the process of change through the information and support that they are able to mobilise. It 
follows that developing the tools for a broader and more informed approach to GVC analysis 
requires us to recognise that the collection and dissemination of information by interest groups, 
contradictions within the GVC and the legislative activities of sovereign governments, can combine 
to change practices within multipolar GVCs. 
Our findings bring a critical light to bear on existing literature on GVCs. Our case suggests that 
multipolarity and its associated dispersion of power (Ponte, 2014; Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014) do 
provide, in some cases at least, greater potential for the regulation of GVCs. This relates in part to 
the more complex institutional arrangements found in conditions of multipolarity (Sturgeon, 2001). 
Our case also suggests that its multipolarity was associated with greater transparency and 
opportunity for mobilisation and protest (Herod, 1997). This also speaks to the greater openness of 
multipolar GVCs to change as an effect of that mobilisation (Riisgaard and Hammer 2011; Gereffi and 
Lee, 2015). 
Conclusion 
The FCV case study demonstrates how the governance of a GVC can have an evolutionary element. 
In this instance, a change in governance arrangements was triggered by a contingency – the internal 
actions of Indonesian crew – and began to take shape according to the nature of subsequent 
contingencies. New Zealand firms and government avoided doing anything decisive about labour 
abuse despite knowing about the problems for many years. Through a series of convergent events 
brought to a head in 2011, migrant labour emerged as a significant actor, thus bringing about the 
clear transition in governance within a multipolar chain. International recognition of labour abuses in 
turn led to buying firms at the downstream end of the chain taking a direct involvement through 
pressure on their New Zealand supplier firms. Within the GVC, there had been the lack of an 
apparent powerful lead firm or categories of lead firms that exerted control over the upstream 
suppliers – the Korean FCVs. Recall that a multipolar chain is typified by low levels of ‘drivenness’ but 
in this case the actions of crew coupled with external forces and pressure, necessitated the New 
Zealand government to bring about regulatory change.           
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The recognition that governance can shift allows for an understanding of how labour abuses in value 
chains can be addressed. If particular levers are pushed – in this case by the configuration of actors 
placing pressure on the New Zealand government - then governance can and does move in 
unexpected ways. Pressure points were applied, resulting in substantive regulatory change. This is 
something regulatory bodies need to understand and coordinate better - that the dynamics of 
power can shift along the value chain through institutional players exerting strong pressure in value 
chains.                      
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